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Abstract
Pairwise key establishment is one of the fundamental se-
curity services in sensor networks which enables sensor
nodes in a sensor network to communicate securely with
each other using cryptographic techniques. It is not feasi-
ble to apply traditional public key management techniques
in resource-constrained sensor nodes, and also because the
sensor nodes are vulnerable to physical capture. In this pa-
per, we introduce a new scheme called the identity based key
pre-distribution using a pseudo random function (IBPRF),
which has better trade-off between communication over-
head, network connectivity and resilience against node cap-
ture compared to the other key pre-distribution schemes.
Our scheme can be easily adapted in mobile sensor net-
works. This scheme supports the addition of new sensor
nodes after the initial deployment and also works for any
deployment topology. In addition, we propose an improved
version of our scheme to support large sensor networks.
1 Introduction
In a sensor network, many tiny computing nodes called
sensors, are scattered in an area for the purpose of sensing
some data and transmitting the data to nearby base stations
for further processing. The transmission between the sen-
sors is done by short range radio communications. The base
station is assumed to be computationally well-equipped
whereas the sensor nodes are resource-starved. Such net-
works are used in many applications including tracking of
objects in an enemy’s area for military purposes, distributed
seismic measurements, pollution tracking, monitoring fire
and nuclear power plants, tacking patients, engineering and
medical explorations like wildlife monitoring, etc. Mostly
for military purposes, data collected by sensor nodes need
be encrypted before transmitting to neighboring nodes and
base stations.
The following issues make secure communication be-
tween sensor networks different from usual (traditional) net-
works:
• Limited resources in sensor nodes: Each sensor node
contains a primitive processor featuring very low com-
puting speed and only small amount of programmable
memory. An example is the popular Atmel ATmega
128L processor.
• Limited life-time of sensor nodes: Each sensor node
is battery-powered and is expected to operate for only
few days. Therefore, once the deployed sensor nodes
expire, it is necessary to add some fresh nodes for con-
tinuing the data collection operation. This is referred
to as the dynamic management of security objects (like
keys).
• Limited communication abilities of sensor nodes: Sen-
sor nodes have the ability to communicate each other
and the base stations by the short range wireless ra-
dio transmission at low bandwidth and over small com-
munication ranges (typical example is 30 meters (100
feet)).
• Lack of knowledge about deployment configuration:
Most of cases, the post deployment network configu-
ration is not known a priori. As a result, it is unreason-
able to use security algorithms that have strong depen-
dence on locations of sensor nodes in a sensor network.
• Mobility of sensor nodes: Sensor nodes may be mo-
bile or static. If sensor nodes are mobile then they can
change the network configuration at any time.
• Issue of node capture: A part of the network may be
captured by the adversary/enemy. The resilience mea-
surement against node capture is computed by compar-
ing the number of nodes captured, with the fraction of
total network communications that are exposed to the
adversary not including the communications in which
the compromised nodes are directly involved.
Thus, it is not feasible to use public-key cryptosystems
in resource constrained sensor networks. Hence, only the
symmetric cipher such as DES/IDEA/RC5 [12, 11] is the
viable option for encryption/decryption of secret data. But
setting up symmetric keys among communication nodes is
a challenging task in a sensor network. A survey on sensor
networks can be found in [2, 1].
The topology of sensor networks changes due to the fol-
lowing three phases:
• Pre-deployment and deployment phase: Sensor nodes
can be deployed from the truck or the plane in the sen-
sor field.
• Post-deployment phase: Topology can change after de-
ployment because of irregularities in the sensor field
like obstacles or due to jamming, noise, available en-
ergy of the nodes, malfunctioning, etc., or due to the
mobile sensor nodes in the network.
• Redeployment of additional nodes phase: Additional
sensor nodes can be redeployed at any time to replace
the faulty or compromised sensor nodes.
A protocol that establishes cryptographically secure
communication links among the sensor nodes is called
the bootstrapping protocol. Several methods [6, 3, 8, 5]
are already proposed in order to solve the bootstrapping
problem. All these techniques are based on random deploy-
ment models, that is, they do not use the pre-deployment
knowledge of the deployed sensor nodes. Eschenauer and
Gligor [6] proposed the basic random key predistribution
called the EG scheme, in which each sensor is assigned a
set of keys randomly selected from a big key pool of the
keys of the sensor nodes. Chan et al. [3] proposed the
q-composite key predistribution and the random pairwise
keys schemes. For both the EG and the q-composite
schemes, if a small number of sensors are compromised, it
may reveal to compromise a large fraction of pairwise keys
shared between non-compromised sensors. However, the
random pairwise keys predistribution is perfectly secure
against node captures, but there is a problem in supporting
the large network. Liu and Ning’s polynomial-pool based
key predistribution scheme [8] and the matrix-based key
predistribution proposed by Du et al. [4] improve security
considerably. Liu and Ning [10] proposed the extended ver-
sion of the closest pairwise keys scheme [9] for static sensor
networks. Their scheme is based on the pre-deployment
locations of the deployed sensor nodes and a pseudo
random function (PRF) proposed by Goldreich et al. [7].
There is no communication overhead for establishing direct
pairwise keys between neighbor nodes and the scheme is
perfectly secure against node capture.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes our proposed scheme called the identity based key
predistribution using a pseudo random function (IBPRF). In
Section 3, we provide a theoretical analysis for this scheme.
In Section 4, we discuss the security issues with respect to
our scheme. In Section 5, we provide an improved version
of our scheme for distributed sensor networks. In Section 6,
we compare our scheme with the previous schemes [6, 3, 8]
with respect to communication overhead, network connec-
tivity, and resilience against node captures. Finally, Section
7 concludes the paper.
2 Identity Based Key Pre-
Distribution using a Pseudo Ran-
dom Function (IBPRF)
The bootstrapping protocol for the random key predistribu-
tion schemes [6, 3, 8] incurs much more communication
overhead for establishing direct pairwise keys between
sensor nodes in a sensor network. Our goal is to design a
protocol which basically reduces the communication over-
head for establishing direct pairwise keys between sensors
during direct key establishment phase of the bootstrapping.
We propose a new scheme called the identity based key
predistribution using a pseudo random function (IBPRF),
which serves our above desired purpose.
IBPRF has the following interesting properties:
• There is no communication overhead during direct key
establishment phase for establishing direct pairwise
keys between sensors.
• There is no communication overhead during the addi-
tion of new sensor nodes.
• When the sensor nodes are mobile, our scheme easily
establish direct pairwise keys between the mobile sen-
sor nodes and their physical neighbors with which they
do not share keys currently with some desired proba-
bility.
• It works for any deployment topology.
IBPRF is based on the following two ingredients:
• A pseudo random function (PRF) proposed by Goldre-
ich et al. in 1986 [7].
• A master key (MK) shared between each sensor node
and the key setup server.
The different phases for this scheme are as follows.
2.1 Key Pre-Distribution
Let N be a pool of the ids of n sensor nodes in a sensor net-
work. Assume that each sensor node u is capable of holding
a total of m+ 1 cryptographic keys in its key ring Ku. The
key predistribution has the following steps:
• Step-1: For each sensor node u, the key setup server
randomly generates a master-key MKu.
• Step-2: For each sensor node u, the key setup server
selects a set S of m randomly generated ids of sen-
sor nodes from the pool N which are considered
as the probable physical neighbors’ ids. Let S =
{v1, v2, . . . , vm}. For each node id vi ∈ S (i =
1, 2, . . . ,m), the key setup server generates a symmet-
ric key SKu,vi = PRFMKvi (u) as the pairwise key
shared between the nodes u and vi, where MKvi is
the master key for vi and u is the id of the node u.
For each vi ∈ S, the key-plus-id combination
(SKu,vi , vi) is stored in u’s key ring Ku. We note that each
node vi can easily compute the same key SKu,vi with its
master key and the id of node u. The sensor node v is called
a master sensor node of u if the shared key between them is
calculated by SKu,v = PRFMKv (u). In other words, node
u is called a slave sensor node of v if v is a master sensor
node of u.
2.2 Direct Key Establishment
After deployment of sensor nodes in a deployment area (i.e.,
target field), sensor nodes will establish direct pairwise keys
between them. Direct key establishment phase has the fol-
lowing steps:
• Step-1: Each sensor node first locates its all physical
neighbors. Nodes u and v are called physical neigh-
bors if they are within the communication range of
one another. They are called key neighbors if they
share a pairwise key. They are said to be direct neigh-
bors if they are both physical as well as key neigh-
bors. Now, after identifying the physical neighbors
by a sensor node u, it can easily verify which ids
of the physical neighbors exist in its key ring Ku.
If u finds that it has the predistributed pairwise key
SKu,v = PRFMKv (u) with node v then it informs
sensor v that it has such a key. This notification is done
by sending a short message containing the id of node u
that u has such a key. We note that this message never
contains the exact value of the key SKu,v.
• Step-2: Upon receiving such a message by node v, it
can easily calculate the shared pairwise key SKu,v =
PRFMKv (u) by using its own master key and the id
of node u.
Thus, nodes u and v can establish a direct pairwise key
shared between them very easily and use this key for their
future communication.
2.3 Path Key Establishment
This is an optional stage, if requires, adds the connectiv-
ity of the network. After direct key establishment, if the
connectivity is still poor, nodes u and v which are physical
neighbors not sharing a pairwise key, can establish a direct
key between them as follows.
• Step-1: u first finds a path 〈u =
u0, u1, u2, . . . , uh−1, uh = v〉 such that each
(ui, ui+1) (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , h− 1) is a secure link.
• Step-2: u generates a random number k′ as the shared
pairwise key between u and v and encrypts it using the
shared key SKu,u1 and sends to node u1.
• Step-3: u1 retrieves k′ by decrypting the encrypted
key using SKu,u1 and encrypts it using the shared key
SKu1,u2 between u1 and u2 and sends to u2.
• Step-4: This process is continued until the key k′
reaches to the desired destination node v.
As a result, nodes u and v use k′ as the direct pairwise key
shared between them for future communication. Since this
process involves more communication overhead to establish
a pairwise key between nodes, in practice h = 2 or 3 is
recommended.
2.4 Mobility of Sensor Nodes
Suppose that a sensor node u moves from one location to
another. Due to location updation of u, the connectivity
of u with the new neighbors may also change. In the
new location, assume that u finds the ids of its some new
physical neighbors with which it does not currently share
any keys. If v be one such physical neighbor, u informs to
v that it has a pairwise key with v. This notification takes
place by sending a request message to v containing the
id of sensor node u excluding the exact value of the key.
Upon receiving this message, v can immediately compute
the pairwise key shared between them by executing one
efficient PRF operation and by using the master key MKv
for v and the id of sensor node u. Thus, u and v use this
key for their future communication.
After performing this stage, if sensor node u finds still
poor connectivity, it may opt for at most 1-hop path key es-
tablishment because path key establishment involves more
communication overhead. Of course we assume that mobil-
ity of sensor nodes are infrequent.
2.5 Addition of Sensor Nodes
In order to add a new sensor node u, the key setup server
selects a set S of m randomly generated ids of sensor
nodes from the pool N . The key setup server randomly
generates a master key MKu for node u. For each sensor
node id v ∈ S, the key setup server takes the master key
MKv and compute the secret key SKu,v = PRFMKv (u)
as the shared pairwise key between nodes u and v, and
distributes the key-plus-id combination (SKu,v, v) to u.
After deployment of sensor node u, it establishes direct
pairwise keys using direct key establishment phase of
IBPRF with the physical neighbors for which the ids are in
u’s key ring Ku.
Now, if u finds still poor connectivity after direct key
establishment, it can perform path key establishment stage
with 2 or 3 hops.
3 Analysis
In this section, we shall now compute the probability of es-
tablishing direct keys between two sensor nodes during di-
rect key establishment, and the probability of establishing
a pairwise key between two sensor nodes during path key
establishment. We shall also analyze the storage overhead
and the communication overhead required by our scheme.
3.1 Probability of Establishing Direct Keys
Let p be the probability that two physical neighbors can
establish a direct pairwise key. For the derivation of p,
we first observe that two physical neighbors u and v can
establish a pairwise key only if the key ring Ku of node
u contains the shared secret key SKu,v = PRFMKv (u)
and the id of node v, or the key ring Kv of node v contains
the shared secret key SKv,u = PRFMKu(v) and the id of
node u because of the fact that any of nodes u and v can
initiate for establishing a pairwise key between them.
We then have, p = 1− (probability that both u and v do
not establish a pairwise key). The total number of ways to
select m ids from the pool N of size n is
(
n
m
)
. For a
fixed key ring Ku of node u, the total number of ways to
select Kv of a node v such that Kv does not have the id of
u is
(
n− 1
m
)
. Thus, we have
p = 1−
(
n− 1
m
)
(
n
m
) = m
n
. (1)
We note that p strictly depends on the network size n and
the key ring size.
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Figure 1: The probability p that two sensors establish a
direct pairwise key v.s. the network size n, with m =
100, 150, 200.
It is clear from Figure 1 that when the network size is small,
our scheme provides better connectivity. Therefore, our
scheme can not support a large network. In section 5, we
have proposed an improved version of our scheme to sup-
port large networks.
3.2 Probability of Establishing Keys using 1-
hop Path Key Establishment
If d be the average number of neighbor nodes that each sen-
sor node can contact, it follows from the similar analysis
in [8] that the probability of two sensor nodes establishing
a pairwise key (directly or indirectly) is
ps = 1− (1 − p)(1− p
2)d. (2)
The network connectivity probabilities for path key es-
tablishment with 1-hop are plotted in Figure 2. From this
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Figure 2: The probability ps of establishing a pairwise key
v.s. the probability p that two sensor nodes establish a direct
pairwise key, with d = 20, 60, 100.
figure it is also clear that we are able to achieve better con-
nectivity after executing this stage even if the network is
almost disconnected initially.
3.3 Calculation of Storage Overhead
Each sensor node has to store a master key which is shared
with the key setup server and m predistributed key-plus-id
combinations. Hence, our scheme requires a storage over-
head of maximum m+ 1 keys for each sensor node.
3.4 Calculation of Communication Overhead
For establishing a pairwise key between two sensor nodes
u and v, one of them, say u, initiates a request message to
node v that its key ring contains the shared key between
them. Then, after receiving such a request, node v com-
putes the shared key between u and v by performing only
one efficient PRF operation. Hence, the communication
overhead involves only one short message for informing the
other node that it has a pairwise key and the computational
overhead due to single efficient PRF operation.
4 Security Considerations
The security of IBPRF depends on the following facts:
• The security of PRF [7].
• A node’s master key MK which is shared with the key
setup server.
It is observed that if a node’s master key is not disclosed,
no matter how many pairwise keys generated by this master
key are disclosed, the task is still computationally difficult
for an adversary to recover the master key MK as well as the
non-disclosed pairwise keys generated with different ids of
sensor nodes. Again, each pre-distributed pairwise key be-
tween two sensor nodes is generated by using PRF func-
tion randomly. Thus, no matter how many sensor nodes
are compromised, the direct pairwise keys between non-
compromised nodes are still secure. In other word, node
compromise does not eventually lead to compromise of the
direct pairwise keys between the other non-compromised
nodes. In this way, our scheme provides perfect security
against node captures.
5 The Improved Scheme
We note that our basic scheme (IBPRF) provides better
connectivity if the network size is small, whereas it pro-
vides perfect security against node captures. In fact, there
is no communication overhead during establishment of the
direct pairwise keys between sensors and also during the
addition of nodes after their initial deployment.
To support a large sensor network, we wish to apply
our basic scheme in distributed sensor networks. The
deployment region is divided into c number of sub-regions
called the cells such that each cell can communicate with
the base stations comfortably. Let the i-th cell be denoted
by cell i. Assume that each cell i contains ni number of
sensor nodes. In practical situation, it is not always possible
to deploy each node to a pre-determined location in the
deployment region. We further assume that the key setup
server only knows the nodes containing to a particular cell
which will be deployed in that region randomly. In practice,
this assumption is appropriate. Under this configuration,
we now apply our basic scheme to each cell as follows.
Let Ni be the pool of the ids of ni sensor nodes in a
cell cell i. Assume that each sensor node u is capable
of holding a total of m + 1 cryptographic keys. In key
pre-distribution phase, for each node u ∈ cell i, the key
setup server randomly generates a master key MKu. For
each node u ∈ cell i, the key setup server also selects a set
S of m randomly generated ids of the sensor nodes from the
pool Ni. For each v ∈ S, the key setup server generates a
symmetric key SKu,v = PRFMKv (u) as the pairwise key
shared between nodes u and v, where MKv is the master
key for node v and u is the id for node u. The key-plus-id
combination (SKu,v, v) is stored in u’s key ring Ku.
After deployment of the sensor nodes, they establish direct
pairwise keys using direct key establishment phase of our
basic scheme (IBPRF). The other phases like path key
establishment, mobility of sensor nodes, and addition of
sensor nodes remain same as our basic scheme.
Thus, sensor nodes in each cell establish pairwise
keys between them and communicate with each other
in that cell securely. For mobility of the sensor nodes,
we restrict the sensor nodes to move in a particular cell only.
Let pi denote the probability that two sensor nodes in the
i-th cell cell i can establish a direct pairwise key between
them. Similar to analysis in 3.1, we have
pi = 1−
(
ni − 1
m
)
(
ni
m
) = m
ni
. (3)
The (average) probability that two sensor nodes in a net-
work of size n =
∑c
i=1 ni, establish a direct pairwise key
between them is given by
p =
∑c
i=1 pi
c
. (4)
Hence, we are able to achieve better connectivity for the
entire network by using our improved version and selecting
the appropriate size of the cells. However, the communi-
cation overhead as well as resilience measurement against
node captures remain same as our basic scheme (IBPRF).
We note that this improved scheme may not always work
for ad hoc mode sensor networks.
6 Comparison with Previous
Schemes
In this section, we compare both our basic scheme (IBPRF)
and the improved scheme with the EG [6], the q-composite
(qC) [3], and the polynomial-pool based [8] schemes
with respect to the communication overhead, network
connectivity and resilience against node captures.
(1) Communication overhead
For the EG and the q-composite schemes, when a node
wishes to establish pairwise keys with its physical neighbor
nodes, it needs to send a list of some messages encrypted
by keys in its key ring.
In case of the polynomial-pool based scheme, a sensor
node also needs to send a list of some messages encrypted
by potential pairwise keys based on its polynomial shares
for establishing a direct pairwise key with a physical
neighbor.
Thus, the communication overhead is on the order of the
key ring size for these schemes. But, for our schemes, the
communication overhead is only due to one short message
sent by a node to inform its physical neighbor that it has
a pairwise key in its key ring and a single efficient PRF
operation for computing the shared key SK by the physical
neighbor. Hence, both our basic scheme (IBPRF) and the
improved scheme have much less communication overhead
than the EG, the q-composite, and the polynomial-pool
based schemes.
(2) Resilience against node capture
From the analysis of the EG scheme [6] and the q-
composite scheme [3], it follows that even if the number of
nodes captured is small, these schemes may reveal a large
fraction of pairwise keys shared between non-compromised
sensors. The analysis of the polynomial-pool based
scheme [8] shows that this scheme is unconditionally se-
cure and t-collusion resistant. Thus, it has better resilience
against node captures than the EG and the q-composite
schemes. However, both our basic scheme (IBPRF) and
the improved scheme provide perfect security against node
captures.
(3) Network connectivity
For the EG scheme [6], the probability of establishing a
direct pairwise key between two sensor nodes is
pEG = 1−
(
M −m
m
)
(
M
m
) = 1−
m−1∏
i=0
M −m− i
M − i
(5)
where M and m are the key pool size and key ring size of a
sensor node.
For the q-composite scheme [3], the probability of estab-
lishing a direct pairwise key between two sensor nodes is
pqC = 1−
q−1∑
i=0
pi (6)
where pi =
(
M
i
)(
M − i
2(m− i)
)(
2(m− i)
m− i
)
(
M
m
)
2 , M is
the key pool size and m is the key ring size of a sensor node.
For the polynomial-pool based scheme [8], the probabil-
ity of establishing a direct pairwise key between two sensor
nodes is
ppoly−pool = 1−
(
s− s′
s′
)
(
s
s′
) = 1−
s′−1∏
i=0
s− s′ − i
s− i
(7)
where s is the polynomial-pool size and s′ is the number
of shares given to a sensor node. Thus, we see that the EG
and the q-composite schemes depend on M and m. The
polynomial-pool based scheme depends on s and s′ and
the maximum supported network size is bounded by (t+1)s
s′
,
where t is the degree of the symmetric bivariate polynomial,
whereas our scheme depends on the network size n and the
key ring size m.
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Figure 3: The probability p of establishing a common key
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resilient against node compromise. Assume that each sensor
node is capable of holding 200 keys.
For comparison of network connectivity, we only con-
sider the polynomial-pool based scheme because it is more
resilient against node compromise than the EG scheme and
the q-composite scheme. However, both the EG scheme and
the q-composite scheme support networks of arbitarily big
sizes. The relationship between the probability of establish-
ing direct keys and the maximum supported network size
for the polynomial-pool based scheme and our basic scheme
(IBPRF) is shown in Figure 3. We assume that each sensor
is capable of storing 200 keys in its key ring. From this
figure, it is very clear that our scheme provides better con-
nectivity than the polynomial-pool based scheme in order to
be resilient against node compromise.
7 Conclusion
Our basic scheme (IBPRF) is an alternative to direct key
establishment of the bootstrapping protocol. Both IBPRF
and the improved scheme guarantee that they have better
trade-off between communication overhead, network con-
nectivity and also resilience against node captures compared
to the EG, the q-composite, and the polynomial-pool based
schemes. Both schemes can also be adapted for mobile sen-
sor networks by initiating direct key establishment phase
and one can achieve reasonable connectivity by applying
these schemes.
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